## Self-driving\*: Introduction, Challenges and Open Questions



Nuro

Lomonosov MSU

nuro



LOMONOSOV MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY


> May 25<sup>th</sup>, 2023 DLS presentation

\*Behavior point of view

## Alex's Intro


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- **Motto:** Standing on the shoulders of giants
- Approach: to combine Academia and Industry Research
  - <u>Academia</u>: Ph.D., lecturer on theory of ML/DL
    - Industry: TLM, Autonomy Interaction Research -> Behavior Research



## Nuro's intro

- <u>Motto</u>: Better everyday life through robotics
- <u>Approach</u>: to build a self-driving electric last mile delivery bot w/o any driver/passenger
  - Self-driving: ML/DL/AI/Robotics in SW
  - Electric: HW Research
  - Last mile delivery: Restriction of Operation Design Domains
  - Driverless/passenger-free: Slightly different implementation constraints (both SW and HW)



## nuro

Three generations of custom electric vehicles.

1st



AV to receive NHTSA-approved exemption.





Seven leading brands who are trusted partners. States with autonomy operations on public roads—CA & TX.

#### Nuro's Tech Talks on YouTube: playlist

# What is Autonomy Stack itself?



## AD and SDV


- **AD** = Autonomous Driving: the *task*
- **SDV** = Self-Driving Vehicle: the *car*
- *AD* is one of the most complex and difficult tasks, both theoretically and practically



<u>Safety</u> of SDV and other agents on the road is crucial


## AD: ML Stack of Technologies

- The main **software** parts are the so-called **P**<sup>3</sup>:
  - Perception, Prediction and Planning
- Hardware parts:
  - Input: Sensors
  - Output: Control (steering, acceleration)
- High-Definition Map as the helper
  - HD-Map contains info about the road



## SDV: Sensors

- Various **sensors** are used:
  - LIDAR
  - Radar
  - Ultra Sound
  - Cameras (x N)



Steering

Acc


Control


#### • **Problems**:

- Expensive
- Hard to synchronize

## AD: HD-Map


- Helpful for prediction and planning
  - Contains information about a **road**:
    - Lanes, crosswalks, traffic lights, etc.
- Problems:
  - Every company has its own format
  - Significant overhead






## AD: Detection

- The *first* step of the Perception part:
  - **Detection** (segmentation, depth-estimation, etc.) of the objects around
- **Problems**:
  - Long tail (small and unusual objects) and anomalies







## AD: Tracking

- The *second* step of the Perception part:
  - **Tracking** of the detected objects and estimation of their coordinates for the Prediction part
- Problems:


• Track association of flickering objects KITTI 2011\_09\_29\_drive\_0004






## AD: Prediction


- Future trajectories **prediction** of all surrounding objects based on the *tracking history* and *HD-Map* 
  - Usually, 1-10 second
- Problems:
  - Multi-modality for recall






## AD: Planning


- **Planning** of SDV future actions based on the *predictions* and *HD-Map*
- Problems:
  - Consistent joint prediction and planning






## SDV: Control

- Realization and **control** of SDV actions based on motion plan
  - Steering control, acceleration control, etc.



**Problems**:

Dynamic and



# Let's go deeper and start with regulations



## US Department of Transportation

USDOT: Automated Vehicles activities



Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: Accelerating the Next Revolution In Roadway Safety

Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety

Automated Vehicles 3.0: Preparing for the Future of Transportation

Automated Vehicles 4.0: Ensuring American Leadership in Automated Vehicle Technologies

Automated Vehicles Comprehensive Plan

YYY

## Five Eras of Safety

According to <u>National Highway Traffic Safety</u> Administration (NHTSA) 1950-2000

Safety/Convenience Features

2000-2010

Advanced Safety Features

2010-2016

**Advanced Driver Assistance Features** 

2016-2025

**Partially Automated Safety Features** 

2025+

**Fully Automated Safety Features** 

Cruise Control Seat Belts Antilock Brakes

Electronic Stability Control Blind Spot Detection Forward Collision Warning Lane Departure Warning


Rearview Video Systems Automatic Emergency Braking Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking Rear Automatic Emergency Braking Rear Cross Traffic Alert Lane Centering Assist

Lane Keeping Assist Adaptive Cruise Control Traffic Jam Assist

Everything? \* probably not only above things but even more and/or wider adoption


#### Levels of Automation 3 0 2 5 No Driver Partial Conditional High Full **Automation** Assistance Automation **Automation** Automation **Automation** Vehicle is controlled Vehicle has combined Driver is a necessity, Zero autonomy; The vehicle is capable The vehicle is capable the driver performs by the driver, but automated functions, but is not required of performing all of performing all all driving tasks. like acceleration and to monitor the driving functions driving functions some driving assist features may be steering, but the driver environment. under certain under all conditions. included in the The driver must be conditions. The driver must remain engaged The driver may with the driving task vehicle design. ready to take control may have the option have the option to and monitor the of the vehicle at all to control the vehicle. control the vehicle. environment at times with notice. all times.

## AV Holistic Plan



## State Regulations

#### CA DMV Autonomous Vehicle <u>Testing Permit</u> holders



CA and NV are the only states that allow deployment and require a permit.

California Department of Motor Vehicles (CA DMV)

\* And NV's process is much simpler

## State Regulations: metrics

Main metrics to <u>report</u>:

- <u>Collisions</u>
- Disengagements
- <u>Mileage</u> (in addition to Disengagement)

Article 3.7. Testing of Autonomous Vehicles (Effective 4/13/2022) § 227.00. Purpose. § 227.02. Definitions. § 227.04. Requirements for a Manufacturer's Testing Permit. § 227.06. Evidence of Financial Responsibility. § 227.08. Instrument of Insurance. § 227.10. Surety Bond. § 227.12. Certificate of Self-Insurance. § 227.14. Autonomous Test Vehicles Proof of Financial Responsibility. § 227.16. Identification of Autonomous Test Vehicles. § 227.18. Manufacturer's Testing Permit and Manufacturer's Testing Permit - Driverless Vehicles. § 227.20. Review of Application. § 227.22. Term of Permit. § 227.24. Enrollment in Employer Pull Notice Program. § 227.26. Prohibitions on Operation on Public Roads. § 227.28. Vehicles Excluded from Testing and Deployment. § 227.30. Manufacturer's Testing Permit Application. § 227.32. Requirements for Autonomous Vehicle Test Drivers. § 227.34. Autonomous Vehicle Test Driver Qualifications. § 227.36. Autonomous Vehicle Test Driver Training Program. § 227.38. Manufacturer's Permit to Test Autonomous Vehicles that DO Not Require a Driver. § 227.40. Refusal of Autonomous Vehicle Testing Permit or Testing Permit Renewal. § 227.42. Suspension or Revocation of Autonomous Vehicle Testing Permit. § 227.44. Demand for Hearing. § 227.46. Reinstatement of Testing Permit. § 227.48. Reporting Collisions. § 227.50. Reporting Disengagement of Autonomous Mode.

§ 227.52. Test Vehicle Registration and Certificates of Title.

§ 227.54. Transfers of Interest or Title for an Autonomous Test Vehicle.

## International Standards

- International Electrotechnical Commission
- Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Systems (<u>IEC</u> <u>61508</u>)

#### Consequence Negligible Likelihood Catastrophic Critical Marginal Frequent Т Ш Probable Т Ш Ш 1 Ш Occasional Т Ш IV Ш Ш Remote Improbable Ш Ш IV IV Incredible IV IV IV IV

**Risk class** matrix

### **Risk Analysis**

- **Class I**: Unacceptable in any circumstance;
- **Class II**: Undesirable: tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if the costs are grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained;
- **Class III**: Tolerable if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement;
- **Class IV**: Acceptable as it stands, though it may need to be monitored.

#### Likelihood of occurrence

Category	Definition	Range (failures per year)		
Frequent	Many times in lifetime	> 10 <sup>-3</sup>		
Probable	Several times in lifetime	10 <sup>-3</sup> to 10 <sup>-4</sup>		
Occasional	Once in lifetime	10 <sup>-4</sup> to 10 <sup>-5</sup>		
Remote	Unlikely in lifetime	10 <sup>-5</sup> to 10 <sup>-6</sup>		
Improbable	Very unlikely to occur	10 <sup>-6</sup> to 10 <sup>-7</sup>		
Incredible	Cannot believe that it could occur	< 10 <sup>-7</sup>		

#### Consequences

Category	Definition
Catastrophic	Multiple loss of life
Critical	Loss of a single life
Marginal	Major injuries to one or more persons
Negligible	Minor injuries at worst

## International Standards

 International Organization for Standardization

 $ASIL = S \times E \times C$ 

 Road vehicles – Functional safety (<u>ISO</u> 26262)

		C1	C2	C3	
<b>S1</b>	E1	QM	QM	QM	
<b>S1</b>	E2	QM	QM	QM	
<b>S1</b>	E3	QM	QM	ASIL A	
<b>S1</b>	<b>E4</b>	QM	ASIL A	ASIL B	
S2	E1	QM	QM	QM	
<b>S2</b>	E2	QM	QM	ASIL A	
S2	E3	QM	ASIL A	ASIL B	
<b>S2</b>	<b>E4</b>	ASIL A	ASIL B	ASIL C	
<b>S</b> 3	E1	QM	QM	ASIL A	
<b>S</b> 3	E2	QM	ASIL A	ASIL B	
<b>S</b> 3	E3	ASIL A	ASIL B	ASIL C	
<b>S</b> 3	<b>E4</b>	ASIL B	ASIL C	ASIL D	

Autonomous Driving: ASIL D => acceptable probability of system / component failure of one in a hundred million

#### Severity Classifications (S):

- S0 No Injuries
- S1 Light to moderate injuries
- S2 Severe to life-threatening (survival probable) injuries
- S3 Life-threatening (survival uncertain) to fatal injuries

#### **Exposure** Classifications (E):

- E0 Incredibly unlikely
- E1 Very low probability (injury could happen only in rare operating conditions)
- E2 Low probability

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- E3 Medium probability
- E4 High probability (injury could happen under most operating conditions)

#### Controllability Classifications (C):

- C0 Controllable in general
- C1 Simply controllable
  - C2 Normally controllable (most drivers could act to prevent injury)
- C3 Difficult to control or uncontrollable

#### Safety integrity level (SIL)

SIL	Low demand mode: average probability of failure on demand	High demand or continuous mode: and probability of dangerous failure per hour		
1	$\ge 10^{-2}$ to < $10^{-1}$	$\ge 10^{-6}$ to $< 10^{-5}$		
2	$\ge 10^{-3}$ to < $10^{-2}$	$\ge 10^{-7}$ to $< 10^{-6}$		
3	$\ge 10^{-4}$ to < 10^{-3}	$\ge 10^{-8}$ to < 10 <sup>-7</sup> (1 dangerous failure in 1140 years)		
4	$\ge 10^{-5}$ to < $10^{-4}$	$\ge 10^{-9} \text{ to} < 10^{-8}$		

#### Automotive Safety integrity level (ASIL) vs SIL

Domain	Domain-Specific Safety Levels					
Automotive (ISO 26262)	QM	ASIL A	ASIL B A	ASIL C	ASIL D	-
General (IEC 61508)	-	SIL-1	SIL-2		SIL-3	SIL-4

Wiki on IEC 61508 and ASIL (I)

All these regulations are about physical (onroad) metrics.

# How to ensure the safe & fast development cycle?



## Simulators

Q: How to **safely test** the autonomous capabilities?

A: Using the **simulator**!

Main challenges:

- Sensors simulation
- Behavior simulation

#### **CARLA** simulator



### +<u>NVIDIA DRIVE Sim</u>, <u>Deepdrive</u>, <u>LGSVL</u>, <u>SUMMIT</u>, <u>Flow</u>, ...

+Internal and specific to any AV company simulators

## Simulators reliability

#### <u>Reliability</u> questions:

- How to guarantee the **generalization** of simulation results?
- Can we really rely on any **metrics inside** the simulation?

#### SIMULATION




#### REALITY








Paperswithcode.com: Domain (distribution) shift

Medium.com: Simulation vs Reality in Marketing










Sim2real, meta-learning, causality usage, ...

- VC, PAC, generalization bounds...




# How to ensure the safe & fast development cycle?



### Metrics

<u>Common</u> metrics of AV:

- Miles per (critical) disengagement (MPD, MPCD)
- **Inverse**: number of disengagements per thousand of miles



## Metrics in the literature


#### Proxy metrics:

- Time to Collision
- Collision rate
- Off-road rate
- Off-route rate
- L2-based
- Comfort-based
  - Jerk
  - Lateral acceleration
- ...

#### Metrics:

٠

- **Open**-loop vs **Closed**-loop
  - L2-distance is not very important for closed-loop eval
- Eval-only vs Train+eval
  - The earlier to get the signal for the model, the better
  - **Correlation** of MPCD/Disengagements with proxy metrics?
    - What are just regularization metrics for better train / faster eval?




Sadat, Abbas, et al. "Perceive, predict, and plan: Safe motion planning through interpretable semantic representations." 2020.

## Do we really need to stick to the classical Autonomy Stack?





#### Classical modular structure



#### Each module:

- Has its **own** training / validation **data**
- Can be developed independently

## Stack: unification?

Modular system being very useful still has **cons**:


- **Sub-optimal** optimization and performance
- Hard to propagate uncertainty estimations

Would be **helpful**:

- To **propagate** the learning **signal** through the **whole** stack
- (Probably) **not to do end2end** approach like *Behavior Cloning* (or even *Imitation Learning*)


Is it real?

- The "**Theorem of existence**" provides the way to incorporate the nondifferentiable modules into the pipeline
  - Although done for some narrow class of tasks




## Stack: unification I

#### Combine: **Perception** + **Prediction**



## Stack: unification II


#### Combine: Prediction + Planning



*Liu, Jerry, et al.* "<u>Deep structured reactive planning</u>." 2021.


## Stack: unification III

#### Combine: Perception + Prediction + Planning



## Stack: unification IV

### Combine: Mapping + Perception + Prediction + Planning




Casas, Sergio, et al. "<u>Mp3: A unified model to map, perceive, predict and plan</u>." 2021.

## Stack and RL

**Reinforcement Learning** can be added for some of the modules combination

- Naturally integrates planning
- State defines the amount of input information (and the combination of modules as well)



Wen, Lu, et al. "Safe reinforcement learning for autonomous vehicles through parallel constrained policy optimization." 2020.


## Intermediate Takeaways

- → Hard to use common AV metrics for research
- → Current closed-loop evaluation is still imperfect
- Need to understand what are discrepancies w.r.t. the real environments (distribution shift) and how to certify the current results (analytical guarantee)
- → Eventually the technological approach can be much (or even completely) different from the classical one

## Bright Future

Great change of paradigm:

- <sup>1.</sup> Be as a human driver:
  - **N** years?
- 2. Be **much better** as a human driver:
  - Is it really a jump of  $N \rightarrow NN$  years?



Source: IDTechEx

Do we have the clear understanding / roadmap for introducing high Automation levels?



#### Levels of Automation 3 0 2 5 No Driver Partial Conditional High Full **Automation** Assistance Automation **Automation** Automation **Automation** Vehicle is controlled Vehicle has combined Driver is a necessity, Zero autonomy; The vehicle is capable The vehicle is capable the driver performs by the driver, but automated functions, but is not required of performing all of performing all all driving tasks. like acceleration and to monitor the driving functions driving functions some driving assist features may be steering, but the driver environment. under certain under all conditions. included in the The driver must be conditions. The driver must remain engaged The driver may with the driving task vehicle design. ready to take control may have the option have the option to and monitor the of the vehicle at all to control the vehicle. control the vehicle. environment at times with notice. all times.

## Conditional Automation

**Q**: how to make **notice** for driver *in advance*? Is it **realistically** doable and useful?

#### Problem:


- Example: collision avoidance signal<sup>1</sup>
- Time of human reaction: 1-2 seconds<sup>2</sup>
- **False** positives avoidance **vs true** positives coverage

W/ and w/o waiting for the human feedback:

- Automatic Emergency Braking

- Pros: greatly *reduces rear-end collisions* (by 40-50%)

- Cons: still not ideal (have *hundreds per year accidents* caused by drivers placing too much confidence in automatic brakes)



0.7 sec -- about as fast as it gets
1.0 sec -- old standard
1.5 sec -- common use
2.0 sec -- common use
2.3 sec -- AVERAGE
2.5 sec -- used in a few states
3.0 sec -- NSC and UK Standard

**Driver reaction times** 

Wiki on Collision Avoidance System

McGehee, Daniel. et al. "Driver reaction time in crash avoidance research: Validation of a driving simulator study on a test track." 2000. + copradar.com

## High vs Full Automation


**Q**: how to understand that we are **in** or **out** of our "**certain** conditions"?

#### Problem:

- need to understand the input **distribution shift**
- need to understand it for **every single module** inside the Autonomy Stack (e.g., Perception, Prediction, Planning, etc)

Possible **solution**:

- (Variational) Autoencoders<sup>1</sup>
- Cons: How to behave if OOD/Anomaly (see "<u>Conditional Automation</u>")?



## **Full Automation**

**Q**: how to make the model **working** for **all input** (even weird) conditions?


#### Problem:

- known unknowns: specific adversarial RL agents for the specifically designed scenario
- unknown unknowns: some physically plausible input providing "bad" outputs (e.g., collisions)

Possible solutions:

- Adversarial RL agents
- Cons: *limited* by scenario generation and RL engine capabilities
- Backpropagation<sup>1</sup> w.r.t. Input
- Cons: full-stack usually hardly

backpropagatable, constraints on Input



Without attack

Under attack

What could be the **development stepping stones** for reaching the self-driving?



## Differentiability

**Q**: how to propagate the learning signal (and uncertainty estimations) through the whole stack?

#### Problem:


- avoid **end2end** approach like *Behavior Cloning*
- **re-use** the existing modules and *expert* knowledge

Possible solutions:

- **Approximation** of non-differentiable modules by:

- differentiable wrapping<sup>1</sup>
- differentiable approximation<sup>2</sup>
- Cons:
- constraints on modules inside wrapping

- *hard / slow* to approximate some existing modules (iLQR, sampling)



Vlastelica, Marin, et al. "<u>Differentiation of blackbox combinatorial solvers</u>." 2019 Karkus, Peter, et al. "<u>DiffStack: A Differentiable and Modular Control Stack for Autonomous Vehicles.</u>" 2022.



Q: how to ensure consistency between:


- between prediction and planning,
- different predictions,
- and how to evaluate it?

#### Problem:

- **feedback loop** between the robot future and other road agents futures
- mining of interactivity scenes

#### Possible solutions:

- **Heuristically** (e.g., by distance) defining the interactive scenes/agents
- Conditional Behavior Prediction by the **new model input** (robot planned future)
- Conditioning in the autoregressive way



PRECog<sup>2</sup>

## Jointness II

Q: how to ensure consistency between:

- between prediction and planning,

- different predictions, and how to evaluate it?

#### Problem:


- working on top of marginals is error-prone

- considering all the combinations of agents leads to a **combinatorial** complexity **explosion** 

Possible solutions:

- Different mitigations:

- Joint pairwise by message passing<sup>1</sup>
- Jointness by transformer decoder<sup>2</sup>
- Jointness by the unified latent<sup>3</sup>
- These are still mitigations



Sample once

N(0, I)

GNN

Ζ<sub>κ</sub>

Luo, Wenjie, et al. "JFP: Joint Future Prediction with Interactive Multi-Agent Modeling for Autonomous Driving." 2023 Ngiam, Jiquan, et al. "Scene Transformer: A unified architecture for predicting multiple agent trajectories." 2021 Cui, Alexander, et al. "Lookout: Diverse multi-future prediction and planning for self-driving." 2021

## Jointness III

Q: how to ensure consistency between:

- between prediction and planning,

- different predictions,


and how to evaluate it?

#### Problem:

- need new joint metrics
- need public **datasets** and **challenges** supporting it

Possible solutions:

- Scene-level analogs of marginals
- minSADE vs minADE
- **Waymo<sup>1</sup>** (pairwise joint) and **Interaction<sup>2</sup>** (pairwise and fully joint conditional) datasets



$$minADE = \frac{1}{l} \sum_{i=1}^{l} \min_{k} ||x_{i}^{k} - x_{i}^{gt}|| \qquad \implies minSADE = \frac{1}{l} \min_{k} \sum_{i=1}^{l} ||x_{scene,i}^{k} - x_{i}^{gt}||$$

Ettinger, Scott, et al. "Large scale interactive motion forecasting for autonomous driving: The waymo open motion dataset." 2021 Zhan, Wei, et al. "Interaction dataset: An international, adversarial and cooperative motion dataset in interactive driving scenarios with semantic maps." 2019



#### Q: how to incorporate Reinforcement

**Learning** (RL) into the Autonomy Stack taking into account safety requirements?


#### Problem:

- Explicit Planning by RL is unstable / unreliable
- Hard to balance and optimize multiple safety constraints

Possible solutions:

- Instead of explicit Planning by RL, **fine-tuning by RL rollouts**
- Cons: having the good model is a *chicken-egg* problem
- Usage of **Human Preference<sup>2</sup>** labels (RL from Human Feedback (HF)): ChatGPT<sup>1</sup>-like approach
- Cons: 1) *absence* of a good *foundation* model for AD; 2) *hard* to get *lots of HF labels* for AV
- Still unknown what is the best way to **inject safety constraints** (and is it needed explicitly?)

OpenAI: <u>ChatGPT</u> Hugginface: <u>RL from HF</u> Reuters: <u>GM explores using ChatGPT in vehicles</u>



# How to evaluate our progress being engineers?



## Evaluation

**Q**: how to make the evaluation process be **less costly** and **faster**?

#### Problem:


- **how** (metrics) and **where** (modular vs end2end) to evaluate?

- need in **submodular** eval?

Possible solutions:

- End2end comparison with the human expert
- Cons: it is only Imitation Learning-like metric
- **Submodular comparison** with the human expert
- Cons: need to produce the robot trajectory as soon as possible

- Necessity vs sufficiency



## Conclusion

- → Formal Automation Levels definition are not clarifying the possible approaches to reach them
- → Stepping stones towards the full self-driving are reasonable but not set in stone
- → Consistency in a model output is going to be a trend; but need deeper support from datasets/metrics/challenges
- → Evaluation is painful
- → "ADGPT" to the rescue?



- Introduction: <u>Autonomy: Introduction of ML for High School</u>
- Part I: Autonomy Challenges (presentation, video)
- Part II: <u>Autonomy: Open Questions</u>

Thank you!